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Abstract
In this paper we describe a network invariant for all congurations of the Future-
bus+ Cache Coherence Protocol. The network invariant was computed with PAX
and veried by a model checker. Using this invariant we are able to prove a speci-
cation of cache coherence correct for an arbitrary number of components on a single
bus of the system. This specication includes a progress property not proven yet.
We show how the result for the single bus system can be extended to tree-shaped
systems. This is, as far as we know, the rst uniform proof of the protocol with
multiple data-buses.
1 Introduction
The automatic or semi-automatic verication of parameterised networks, i.e.,
of the family of systems P = fP
i
j i 2 !g, where each P
i
is a network con-
sisting of i processes, is an interesting but diÆcult task: In [2] it is shown,
that the verication problem for parameterised networks is undecidable in
general. Nevertheless, automatic and semi-automatic methods for the veri-
cation of restricted classes of parameterised networks have been developed,
e.g., [21,29,16,23,1,7,5]. These methods have not been applied to a real-world
example, yet. We demonstrate, that the method of abstraction of WS1S tran-
sition systems [3,4,5] can be applied to the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence
Protocol [19].
Considerable eort has been invested into the verication of the IEEE
Futurebus+ protocol [11,6,20,12]. Either these eorts have not presented a
uniform proof of correctness, i.e., a proof which establishes correctness for all
instances of the parameterised network, or they have only veried a subset of
the cache coherence specication.
c
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We base our proof method on the method described in [3,4,5]. It consists
of building a model of the parameterised network in the theory of weak sec-
ond order logic of one successor (WS1S) [8,15,28]. The dynamic behaviour
is described with a WS1S transition system. An abstraction relation is for-
mulated in WS1S. Both serve as input to the tools PAX, which computes an
nite-state abstract system from the model using MONA [18]. The resulting
abstract system is suitable as an input to a symbolic model checker [26,10,12],
which validates the specication. Our specication is given in linear time tem-
poral logic (LTL) [25]. It can be checked using the model checker NuSMV [9]
is used.
In [3,4,5] the parallel composition is asynchronous, i.e., based on an in-
terleaving semantics. To handle architecture of the Futurebus+ protocol we
extend the method with synchronous parallel composition.
Using this method we prove the protocol correct with respect to a speci-
cation of cache coherence, which includes a progress property, which has not
yet been proven in literature. Moreover, by using compositional reasoning, we
prove the protocol correct for tree structures.
Road Map
In the next section we introduce the notation and denitions used in this arti-
cle. We recall the denition of WS1S transition systems. Section 3 describes
our extension of the proof method in [3,4,5] to synchronous parallel compo-
sition. A short description of the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol is
given in Sect. 4. Section 5 recalls the denition of L-simulation and network
invariants, summarises the results of [22] and describes the construction of
the network invariant for the general case. We close this article with a short
conclusion and comparison to related work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we briey recall the basic denitions of WS1S [8,15,28] and
boolean transition systems [3,4].
Terms of WS1S are build from the constant 0, rst-order variables, and
the successor function t:t + 1 applied to a term t. Second-order terms are
either second-order variables, the constant ; denoting the empty set, or terms
of the form X [X
0
, X \X
0
, or X nX
0
, where X and X
0
denote second order
terms. Atomic formulae are of the form b, t = t
0
, t < t
0
, or t 2 X, where b
is a propositional variable, t and t
0
are both terms, and X is a second-order
term. WS1S-formulae are build from atomic formulae by applying the boolean
connectives as well as quantication over rst and second-order variables.
First-order monadic formulae are WS1S-formulae in which no second-order
variables occur. WS1S-formulae are interpreted over models that assign nite
subsets of ! (the natural numbers) to second-order variables and elements of
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! to rst-order variables. The interpretation is dened in the usual way [28].
Given a WS1S formula f , [[f ]] denotes the set of models of f . The set of free
variables is denoted by FV(f). By FV
2
(f) we denote the free second-order
variables, by FV
1
(f) we denote the set of free rst-order variables. One says
that f is (rst-order) closed, if FV(f) = ; (FV
1
(f) = ;). WS1S is a decidable
formalism. Given a WS1S formula f we can construct a nite automaton,
which is enumerating [[f ]]. However, in [27] it is shown that the space needed
to compute the set of models of a WS1S formula is bounded from below by
a stack of powers of two the size of the length of the formula. Despite this
discouraging fact, a decision procedure has been implemented in the MONA
tool [18].
We dene components of a WS1S transition systems in a sub-language
of WS1S called AF(n). For a rst-order variable n let AF(n) be the set of
formulae produced by the grammar:
f ::= x 2 B j :f j f ^ f j f _ f j f ! f j 8
n
x:f j 9
n
x:f ;
where B is a second-order variable and x is a position variable. If m 2 ! then

m
denotes the set of evaluations  such that (n) = m, 0  (x) < m, and
(B)  f0; : : : ; m 1g. 8
n
x:f abbreviates the formula 8x:(0  x^x < n)! f ,
and 9
n
x:f abbreviates the formula 9x:(0  x ^ x < n) ^ f . Similarly for
second-order variables B we abbreviate the formula 8i:i 2 B ! f by 8
B
i:f
and 9i:i 2 B ^ f by 9
B
i:f . The formulae in AF(n) are interpreted over
evaluations  2
S
m2!

m
in the usual way.
Denition 2.1 A boolean transition system (BTS) S(i; n) = (; V; T ) pa-
rameterised by i and n consists of

a nite set V of boolean array variables. A state of a BTS is a valuation 
of the variables of V . The set of all states is denoted by .

a satisable assertion  2 AF(n) with FV()  V [ fig characterising the
set of initial states.

a set T of transitions. Any transition  2 T can be represented by a predi-
cate 

(V; V
0
) 2 AF(n) with FV(

)  V [ V
0
[ fig, relating the unprimed
variables in V to their primed successors in V
0
. We require an idling tran-
sition I 2 T with 
I
(V; V
0
) =
V
v2V
(v $ v
0
).
If (s; s
0
) j= 

(V; V
0
), then s
0
is a  -successor of s, and we will write s

 !s
0
.
A computation of a BTS S(i; n) = (; V; T ) is an innite sequence such that:
Initiality: (0) j= .
Consecution: For all i 2 ! we have (i)

 !
S
(i+ 1) for some  2 T .
3 Synchronous Monadic Parameterised Systems
In [3,4] a proof method is described for the abstraction of parameterised net-
works. This proof method is based on an asynchronous, i.e., interleaving
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based, parallel composition operation. In this section we extend thos proof
method to synchronous parallel composition. To this end, we dene syn-
chronous monadic parameterised systems.
Denition 3.1 The synchronous monadic parameterised system (SMPS),
built from a BTS S(i; n), is the family P = fk
m 1
l=0
S(i; n)[i=l; n=m] jm 2 !
>0
g,
where [=] is the substitution operation and k is the synchronous parallel com-
position.
A SMPS can be represented as a WS1S transition system (WS1S-TS).
Denition 3.2 A WS1S transition system S = (; V; T ) is dened by:

V is a nite set of second order variables, where each variable is interpreted
as a nite set of natural numbers.

The initial condition is given by a satisable assertion  with FV()  V .

T is a nite set of transitions, where each  is represented by a WS1S
formula 

(V; V
0
) with FV(

)  V [ V
0
.
The computations of S are sequences of states and dened as usual. A SMPS
is translated into a bisimilar WS1S-TS by the following translation procedure:
Let P = f1; : : : ; ng be a set of process indices from 1 to n. We use a translation
function  which replaces all occurrences of n by max(P ) + 1. The predicate
part(P;B) = (
^
B;B
0
2B^B 6=B
0
B \B
0
= ;) ^
[
B2B
B = P
determines whether the set system B is a partition of the set P . The transla-
tion procedure is:
Denition 3.3 Consider an SMPS P built from S(i; n) = (; V; T ). Then
the WS1S-TS (
~
;
~
V ;
~
T ) is dened by:

~
V = V [ fPg, where P 62 V .

Let
~
 = 9n:P = f1; : : : ; ng ^ (
V
B2V
B  P ) ^ (8
P
m:).

Let
~
T = f~

g, where ~

= 9
2T
Y

:part(P; fY

j  2 T g) ^ (
V
B2V
B 
P ) ^ (P = P
0
) ^ (8
2T
i

:
V
2T
(i

2 Y

! 

[i=i

2 X
p
])) and 
i2f1;:::;ng
x
i
abbreviates x
1
:x
2
:   x
n
: for  2 f8; 9g.
The transition relation is given by just one formula. However, the space needed
to compute the set of models of a WS1S formula is bounded from below by
a stack of powers of two the size of the length of the formula [27]. In our
case study this resulted in a formula which is to large to be handled with
our resources. This makes it necessary to keep the formula of the transition
relation small. In [22] a method to remedy this situation is presented.
4 The Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol
The intention of this section is to give an overview of how the IEEE Future-
bus+ Protocol [19] works. It denes a cache to be a number of so-called cache
4
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next(cmd) := case
state=invalid: {none,read-shared,read-modified};
state=shared-unmodified: {none,invalidate,read-shared,
read-modified};
state=exclusive-unmodified: {none,copyback};
state=exclusive-modified: {none,copyback};
esac;
Fig. 1. SMV Code of a Cache-Line's Command Part
lines. Part of this standard is a cache-coherence protocol designed to work
in a hierarchically-structured multiple-bus system. The protocol maintains
coherence on individual buses by having the caches snoop, or observe, all bus
transactions. Coherence across buses are maintained using bus-bridges. Spe-
cial agents, called cache and memory agents, at the ends of bridges represent
remote caches and memories. In order to increase performance, the protocol
uses so-called split-transactions. When a transaction is split, its completion is
delayed and the bus is freed; at some later time, an explicit response is issued
to complete the transaction. This facility makes it possible to service local
requests while remote requests are being processed.
The state of a cache line is characterised by the four attributes invalid,
shared-unmodied, exclusive-modied, and exclusive-unmodied. Figure 1 dis-
plays the command part of the system in NuSMV syntax [9]. The following
paragraphs give an informal overview over all transitions.
A transaction is a sequence of events on the bus. Basically, it is a bus com-
mand, which is describing the nature of the transaction. The exact semantics
of a bus command may be modied by one of the bus attributes IV, SR, TF
or WT. Each processor has a local copy of those attributes, called iv, sr, tf
or wt respectively. Usually, if a the local copy of such an attribute is set, it is
also set on the bus by an or (_) operation.
Initially, any cache line is invalid. An invalid cache line must issue a
command or snarf a copy of the desired data to change its state (snarng
means reading the data from a transaction issued by another component). It
is possible for a cache line to transition to any other state from the invalid
state. A module that initiates a read-shared transaction and completes it
successfully transitions to shared-unmodied state if TF is asserted and to
exclusive-unmodied state, otherwise. It may assert tf during a read-shared,
read-invalid or copy-back transaction to change its state to shared-unmodied.
A module initiating a read-modied transaction that completes successfully
will cause its cache line to change state to exclusive-modied.
If a cache line is in shared-unmodied state, it may change its state to
invalid state without a bus transaction at any time. It is required to do so if
it snoops a read-modied, write-invalid, or invalidate transaction. If it snoops
a read-invalid or read-shared transaction and does not assert tf to snarf the
data, it changes state to invalid, too. A module that initiates a invalidate
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transaction that completes successfully changes state to exclusive-modied. It
does not change state otherwise.
Without using any bus transaction a module in exclusive-unmodied state
may change its state to any of the three others at any time. If it snoops a
read-shared or read-invalid transaction during which it asserts tf it changes
state to shared-unmodied and to invalid otherwise. It is required to do so if
it snoops a read-modied, write-invalid or invalidate transaction.
A processor may change the state of a cache line in exclusive-modied state
to invalid or shared-unmodied by initiating a copy-back transaction. It must
assert tf to change state to shared-unmodied. If this module snoops a read-
shared, read-invalid or read-modied transaction, it must assert iv to intervene
and supply the data in place of the memory. It may keep a shared-unmodied
copy if it asserts tf during a read-shared or read-invalid transaction. It al-
ways changes the state of a cache line to invalid if it snoops a write-invalid
transaction.
For any command with WT asserted, a cache line shall not change its
state.
Furthermore, modules may split transactions if access time of a module is
slow compared to bus access time. Cache and memory modules determine if
they need to split a transaction by decoding the address and command for each
cache-coherent read transaction that they snoop. If the module is responsible
for that address and cannot respond immediately, it asserts sr.
If a module splits a read-shared or read-invalid transaction, it must even-
tually respond with a shared-response transaction. This transaction may be
snarfed by any cache. The memory must snarf data from this transaction.
If no other cache signals that it has the cache line or that it is snarng the
data by asserting tf on a shared-response transaction, the line may be tagged
exclusive-unmodied by the requester. Otherwise, it is shared.
If a module splits a read-modied transaction, it must eventually respond
with a modied-response transaction. This transaction may not be snarfed.
The module that originally generated a read-modied or invalidate transaction
and subsequently received a modied-response changes its cache line state to
exclusive-modied.
Modules that split a transaction are required to assert wt if any other
module initiates a request transaction to the same cache line. This forces
a limit of a single outstanding transaction per cache line. When a module
initiating a transaction receives wait status, it has to wait until a shared-
response or modied-response is observed by the cache line, and then it may
repeat its request. In case of a shared-response transaction it may snarf the
data and satisfy its request without a bus transaction.
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Specifying Cache Coherence.
We have based our specication of cache coherence on [11,12]. One specica-
tion was replaced by a progress property with an fairness assumption. To do
this, the specication was rewritten in LTL [25].
In [19] illegal attribute combinations are specied. Whenever such a com-
bination is observed, the system sets a bus-error. Even if the observed trans-
action is legal, it may indicate an error. The absence of these error conditions
is specied as (1).
Next we want that at most one processor, indexed i, has got a writeable
cache line; this is expressed by (2).
If any cache lines i and j have got a cache line in readable state, we require
that they agree on the data. If a cache line i is holding a readable copy, and
the memory line is known to be unmodied, then both should agree on the
data (see (3) and (4)).
The fairness assumption  states that each member on the bus will be
master of the bus innitely often, a command is issued on the bus innitely
often, and that the wait attribute is not persistent, as expressed by (5). Under
this assumption, we require that if a processor is waiting for a request, it will
eventually receive an answer. Also, if a component is obligated to respond to
a request, it will eventually full its obligation, as expressed by (6) and (7).
2:(bus-error _ error)(1)
8i:8j:i 6= j ! (2 p
i
:writeable ! :(p
j
:readable _ p
j
:writeable))(2)
8i:8j:i 6= j ! (2 p
i
:readable ^ p
j
:readable ! p
i
:data = p
j
:data)(3)
8i:2 p
i
:readable ^ :m:memory-line-modied ! p
i
:data = m:data(4)
 = (8d:d 2 D ! 23 d:master) ^ (23CMD 6= none) ^ (23:WT )(5)
8i:! 2 (p
i
:requester 6= none ! 3 (p
i
:requester = none))(6)
8i:! 2 (p
i
:responder 6= none ! 3 (p
i
:responder = none))(7)
5 A Network Invariant for the Futurebus+
No one has yet presented a correct network invariant for the Futurebus+ Cache
Coherence Protocol yet. Let v

L
denote that  is a L-simulation [14] and v
L
that there exist an L-simulation. Then a network invariant is formally dened
by:
Denition 5.1 Let (P;v
L
) be a partially ordered set of processes, and k
monotone with respect to v
L
, i.e., for all P;Q 2 P with P v
L
Q and for
all R 2 P we have P k R v
L
Q k R. Then we call a process I 2 P a network
invariant, if it satises P v
L
I and P k I v
L
I for all P 2 P.
A network invariant is an abstraction for all members of a family [29] and by
this one has:
Theorem 5.2 Let I be a network invariant for P and  a specication. If
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I j= , then for all P 2 P we have P j= .
By this theorem it is suÆcient to nd a network invariant that satises a prop-
erty to show that all members of the family have this property. Unfortunately,
nding a network invariant is a diÆcult task. One might ask whether such a
network invariant can always be found, or even whether one can compute one
automatically. In fact, nding a network invariant is undecidable [29].
5.1 A Network Invariant for the Futurebus+ Single-Bus Case
In this section we describe how we have built a network invariant for single-
bus congurations of the Futurebus+ system. A very similar, but erroneous,
network invariant can be found in [12].
5.1.1 Building a parameterised model
The rst step in the construction of the network invariant was dening a
parameterised model of the protocol as a WS1S transition system. In this
particular case it was a simple task. We used the model described in [11] and
translated it into a BTS (see Def. 2.1). Using the method described in Sect. 3
we have build a WS1S-TS from this description. The memory line and the
bus itself are not considered in the model. They were added by hand to the
WS1S-TS.
Much eort has been invested into minimising the WS1S-TS. The transi-
tion relation of the automata constructed from the WS1S description of the
system may grow exponentially in the number of variables occuring in the
system's description. Therefore, we minimised the number of second-order
variables and the syntactic representation of the transition relation. This is
described in detail in [22].
5.1.2 Finding an abstraction relation
Our network invariant was automatically computed from the WS1S-TS using
the manually supplied abstraction relation:
I$ (8i: p
i
:state = invalid) ^
SU $ (8i: p
i
:state = exclusive-modied ^
p
i
:state 6= exclusive-unmodied) ^
EM $ (9i: p
i
:state = exclusive-modied ^
8j: i 6= j ! p
j
:state = invalid) ^
EU $ (9i: p
i
:state = exclusive-unmodied ^
8j: i 6= j ! p
j
:state = invalid) ^
BAD$:(I _ SU _ EM _ EU ) _ bus-error _ error :
This is a \natural choice" for an abstraction relation. The idea is, that the
abstract process should be able to \mimic" every behaviour of the system it
is abstracting. The same idea is also used in [12]. We introduce an abstract
8
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next(cmd) := case
state=invalid: {none,read-shared,read-modified};
state=shared-unmodified: {none,invalidate,read-shared,
read-modified};
state=exclusive-unmodified: {none,copyback,read-shared,
read-modified};
state=exclusive-modified: {none,copyback,read-shared,
read-modified};
esac;
Fig. 2. SMV Code of the Network-Invariant's Command Part
state BAD , which observes any violation of the safety properties dened in
specications (1) and (2).
The command part of the abstract system is given in Fig. 2. It diers from
the original system only in the way the system issues the next command. By
comparing Fig. 2 to Fig. 1, these changes become apparent:

In exclusive-modied and exclusive-unmodied a read-modied and a read-
shared transaction may be initiated.

If a cache line is in shared-unmodied state, it may issue a read-modied
and a read-shared command.
The next step is to prove whether the system constructed this way is indeed
a network invariant. To do this we have to check whether the system abstract
system and the abstraction relation satisfy Def. 5.1.
The rst requirement (P v

L
I) holds, if the abstraction relation implies
the identity relation, i.e., id

 , where  is the set of states of S(0; 1). For
the second requirement (P k I v

L
I) we can use the fact that the parallel
composition operation used here provides us with an intersection semantics
(see [22] for a proof of this statement), i.e., [[P k I]] = [[P ]]\ [[I]] = [[P ]], because
id

 . Finally we have to check, whether the parallel composition operation
is indeed monotonic with respect to our abstraction relation. Fortunately, this
is the case, as stated by the following Lemma:
Lemma 5.3 Let S
1
= (
1
; V; T
1
), S
2
= (
2
; V; T
2
), and S
3
= (
3
; V; T
3
) be
BTS,  the set of states of S
i
for i 2 f1; 2; 3g,  an abstraction such that
id

 , S
1
v

L
S
2
, and S
1
v

L
S
3
. Then S
1
k S
2
v

L
S
2
k S
3
.
Proof. Because id

  the claim is equivalent to [[S
1
]] \ [[S
2
]]  [[S
2
]] \ [[S
3
]].
By S
1
v

L
S
2
we have [[S
1
]]\ [[S
2
]] = [[S
1
]]. From [[S
1
]]  [[S
2
]] and [[S
1
]]  [[S
3
]]
we have [[S
1
]] \ [[S
1
]]  [[S
2
]] \ [[S
3
]], from which follows the claim.
Hence, for computing a network invariant in our framework, the abstraction
relation only needs to contain the identity relation between the parameterised
system and the abstraction.
Note, that the state BAD is not reached by the abstract system, i.e., the
graph immediately shows the validity of specications (1) and (2).
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next(cmd) := case
state=invalid: {none,copyback,read-shared,read-modified};
state=shared-unmodified: {none,invalidate,copyback};
state=exclusive-unmodified: {none,copyback,read-shared,
read-modified};
state=exclusive-modified: {none,copyback,read-shared,
read-modified};
esac;
Fig. 3. SMV Code of the Command Part of [12]
The reasons for these are: Recall how the next command may be issued by
a processor from Fig. 1. Assume the cache line is in exclusive-modied state.
The processor must not, for example, issue a read-shared command. This can
be done by a two processor conguration, which where the second processor
is in invalid state.
5.1.3 Comparison to [12].
In [12] a system is presented from which the authors claim that it is a network
invariant for the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol. Its command part
is shown in Fig. 3. It is not a network invariant, because: A cache line
in invalid state should not initiate a copyback transaction, because its data
is, well, invalid. Such a transaction invalidates the content of the memory
line. Moreover, a cache line in this model is not allowed to issue any read
command if it is in shared-unmodied state. If one considers the system in
shared-unmodied state and composes it with a cache line in invalid state, the
system in [12] is no abstraction of this system, because it cannot mimic a read
command issued by the invalid cache line.
5.1.4 Verication
The network invariant in Fig. 2 satises the specication of Sect. 4. The
proof was established with PAX and NuSMV. The computations involved took
less than 2Minutes. The specications (6) and (7) needed special treatment,
because any read transaction may be split. This results in a computation
invalidating this specication, where a transaction is always split. Using a
proof rule from [4,5] we can prove that the system satises 23:SR. Hence
we establish the specication for all single-bus congurations.
5.2 Generalising the Result
In this section we describe how to generalise the results from the linear case
to arbitrary network topologies. The construction of the network invariant for
the general case is based upon the following two observations:
(i) The memory board and the memory agent have a very similar behaviour.
If one considers the communication of the memory agent on the bus,
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one cannot distinguish it from a memory board (this is the intention of
its design). We were able to show MA v
L
M , where MA denotes the
memory agent and M the memory board.
(ii) A processor and a cache agent have a very similar behaviour, too. As
above, we have CA v
L
P , where CA is the cache agent and P the pro-
cessor with its cache line.
Using these abstractions and the fact that our parallel composition is
monotonic with respect to v
L
(cf. [22]) the network invariant in question
turns out to be the network invariant for the single-bus case (rf. Sect. 5.1).
This will be established in the following paragraphs.
The rst step is to show, that the bus-bridge BB does not interfere with
normal operation. In our model of the protocol the bus bridge itself has an in-
stant transmission time and only communicates the most necessary behaviour.
The delays introduced by message propagation are simulated by having the
agents non-deterministically split read-commands on their local bus. Then it
easy to see, that BB v
L
B , where B is a data bus. We have already shown,
that M k B k P v
L
I, where I is the network invariant. Using the mono-
tonicity of k with respect to v
L
and the fact that v
L
is transitive, one has
MA k BB k CA v
L
M k B k P v
L
I.
The second step is to put these results together. A single-bus system
is composed of the data bus, a memory unit and an arbitrary number of
processors. By the abstraction MA v
L
M one can replace the memory unit
on a bus by an memory agent without changing its behaviour. Similarly any
processor may be replaced by an cache agent. Hence the bus turned into
a tree node. The main point is, that any of these substitutions have the
same network invariant, because the memory-agent and the cache-agent are
implementations of a memory or a cache, and each agent represents a complete
multi-bus system, representable by the network invariant, on the bus.
Thus we have proven:
Proposition 5.4 I is a network invariant for any conguration of the Fu-
turebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol.
This nishes the proof of the specication for all topologies of the Future-
bus+ Cache Coherence Protocol.
6 Conclusion
By extending the methods presented in [3,4,5] we are able to compute a
network invariant for the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol semi-auto-
matically. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst correct network
invariant. A new progress property not shown before was established (see
Equations (5){(7)). This resulted in applying PAX to a large example. Us-
ing compositional reasoning we have shown that the network invariant for the
general case of the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol is the same as the
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network invariant for the protocol's single-bus case.
It turns out that the time needed to compute and verify the network in-
variant is far less the time needed to model-check a small sample conguration
consisting of two processors. This makes the method presented here promising
for the application to other large examples.
Related Work.
A precise model of the Futurebus+ cache coherence protocol was designed by
E. Clarke et al. [11]. They used temporal logic model checking to show that
the protocol satises a formal specication of cache coherence. They have
veried a selection of examples and not a parameterised version. We have
based our specication of cache coherence on theirs and extended it with a
new progress property.
Parameterised versions of the protocol were veried in [20,6]. Both eorts
only verify a subset of the specication given in [11].
In [20] the states of a network are encoded as a regular language over an
alphabet of the states of its component processes and the transition relation
is represented by a nite state transducer. This idea is improved in [1,7],
where this method is called regular model checking. This method has been
implemented in the Pen program [24]. We have based our method on similar
ideas. For some systems a network invariant can be computed using an algo-
rithm proposed by D. Lesens [23], where widening techniques [13] are used to
compute a network invariant for linear parameterised networks. This idea is
similar to ours. All those methods are semi-automatic or may fail to terminate.
We have used PAX to compute a network invariant [21,29] for single-bus
congurations of the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol. Such network
invariants are described in [12,22]. The network invariant given in [12] is not
correct. Though the abstraction relations are similar, the proof in [12] was
done by hand. Our semi-automatic method increases the condence in the
established proof.
In [16] it is shown that the verication problem for the linear Futurebus+
Cache Coherence Protocol is decidable. However, the verication with PAX
is very fast. It only needed 2Minutes to verify the system. Using a conven-
tional model checker and 2 processors needed 36 hours to model check our
specications.
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